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Do reading teachers understand the nature of reading?
After shoveling through the pedagogic blizzard of word attack
skills, comprehension skills, subskills, scopes and sequences,
pretests and posttests, diagnoses, prescriptions, and evalua-
tions to clear for his or her mind the path of instruction,
does he/she care to know the nature of the primal forces that
generated the storm?
As of this writing, a proven and generally accepted
model of the reading process does not exist. The state of
the knowledge of reading specialists is analogous to the
state of the knowledge of the heavens possessed by ancient
astronomers. With a telescope. the ancients could only con-
clude that the sun and the stars moved around the Earth.
Celtic priests could accurately predict at which point on
the horizon the sun would rise or set. They also knew how
to tell when the longest day of the year would arrive.
The magnificent ruins at Stonehenge, where huge stones are
lined up to point to the spot on the horizon at which the
sun will rise on the summer solstice as well as to act as a
1
2giant calendar, are proof of this. Other cultures also
plotted the courses of the sun and the stars, believing
that mysteries of nature and of the future could be ex-
plained therein. Despite all this astronomical and
astrological preoccupation, it took new technology in
optics and the genius of Copernicus and Galileo to detect
the true motion of things.
Similarly, reading researchers can tell us the
number of fixations a reader can make -in one second
(Holmes and Smith, 1973, p. 65), or the number of milli-
seconds it takes to recognize a lett',er (Gough, 1972), or
the readability of 1040 tax forms (Pyrczak, 1977), or
which muscles shqw electrical activity while a sUbject
reads· (Conrad, 1972) or innumerable other statistics con-
cerning what goes on during the reading process. What
they cannot tell us for certain are the essentials of why
the language process is as it is and how the reading
process fits into the whole of human linguistic behavior.
Perhaps some new technology or new insight will be
introduced by a psycholinguistic Galileo which will bring
order to our knowledge of the constellations of reading
behavior. Beleaguered teachers need not expect dramatic
relief from pangs of self doubt, however. Noam Chomsky
(1975. pp. 26-27) postulates that it may not be possible
Jfor contemporary researchers to profit from the study of
language-learning behavior since we have such limited knowl-
edge of the cognitive structures used. He compares the
modern researcher's plight to that of an early physiologist
trying to learn from the study of the human body under stress
(a four minute miler's peculiar traits, for instance), with-
out the basic knowledge of internal body structure. The
analogy to the measuring of milliseconds that is popular
among some reading researchers is obvious. Chomsky feels
that the human cognitive structures are "no less marvelous
and intricate" (1975, p. 10) than human physical structures.
To carry the analogy further, perhaps the bulk of knowledge
about language and reading is knowledge merely of symptoms
and not of underlying causes.
Must we as reading specialists be content to wait for
the invention of the lenses which will magnify thought
patterns and cognitive structures to observable levels, and
trust with blind faith the teachin.g techniques which, for
reason's unclear, have worked fairly well? After all,
.according to at least one expert (Smi.th, 1973. p. 6), "Any
method that worked the day before the great discovery will
work the day after.·t There is even the possibility,
according to Chomsky (1975. p. 156) that the human intellect
is inherently incapable of understanding itself. Why worry?
4We worry because there exist two fundamentallly
opposed basic theories concerning the nature of the reading
process, each recommending its own pedagogic philosophy.
The conscientious teacher must choose his reason for doing
what he is doing, to have a conceptual base for daily problem
solving.
The better known and perhaps more easily understood
of the two theories might be called the "Suoskill Hypothesis".
It states that reading is a higher order, complex skill which
requires mastery of numerous subskills. (Samuels, et al, 1975,
p. 74). According to subskill theo~ists, good readers are
those who have mastered the component skills.. Reading cur-
ricula which are based on this hypothesis will involve
diagnosis of a reader's skill weaknesses and instruction
specific to those skills.
The other theory, termed "holistic" by Samuels in the
same passage cited above, is concerned with reading as an
extension of the language process, which is considered to be
innate in humans. Since language usage is a natural f'unction
which is perfected more than learned in their eyes, propon-
ents of this theory maintain that fractioning of the process
into subskills destroys the meaning deriving aspect of
reading. In the words of Kenneth S. Goodman (1973. pp. 292-
293): "Unless the teaching of reading is comprehension
5centered, the very nature of the task is changed from
reading to something other than reading." He and those
who agree with him feel that reading should be taught not
as a precise, exact, detailed, and sequential process, but
rather as a selective process wherein the reader uses what-
ever he needs as the means to the desired end. comprehension
(Goodman, 1976, pp. 497-498).
What criterion should the reading specialist use in
choosing which theory, or which parts of which theory, to
include into his or her own understanding of the reading
process? Proponents of each side can be convincing when
they explain things clearly. One might be inclined to use
self-observation or observation of one's students or children
as a standard against which to measure the worth of a
theorist's insight. It·is to be hoped one would not confuse
the relevance of data "lith the quaIlty of its derivation.
Another possible but often overlooked criterion of worth is
the expediency with which a theory might be applied to the
specific situation in which a reading specialist must
function. No amount of ponti~ication and platitudination
concerning what is "correct" pedagogically is of value if it
cannot be put to use.
Usability is a motivating factor in the pursuit of the
research herein. Trying to convince content area teachers
6who are proud of their expertise in their fields but are
unversed in the teaching of reading that they all must teach
it is like trying to convince a beaver that it must not build
its dam. Teachers at my particular school have communicated
to me in no uncertain terms that their workload is such that
diagnosing and prescribing for reading difficulties among
the students in their classes is an unattainable goal with-
out extensive outside help. Even at that, they fear that
such instruction might bog qown or interrupt the flow that
they have worked long years to perfect in their curricula.
Tho'ugh these misgivings were born ir:; fear and ignorance of
the unknown, the preponderous workload in which they were
nurtured is real.
Psycholinguistics, the field of study from which the
"holistic" understanding of the reading process is derived.
became attractive to me then, because it not only made sense
but also seemed promising in my -search for a usable theoreti-
cal base for a high school reading program. I hope that this
paper will explain both the nature of the psycholinguistic
understanding of the reading process and its advantages for
those working in the secondary area. A reading program which
can be ·'added·· to the subject matter taught by people who are
already working at near capacity levels is the desired result.
?In order to understand fUlly the psycholinguistic
models of reading, one must be cognizant of the ideas con-
cerning language and the nature of the human mind from
which they arose. The "prior knowledge" will be provided in
the next chapter.
CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THE f.1IND AND ITS LANGUAGE CAPACITY
How is it that human beings know so much? Noam
Chomsky asks this question in his Reflections on Language
(1975, p. 5). It's an interesting question and a relevant
one to this discussion when it is considered from the view~
point of a psycholinguist. How is it that human beings
know how to ~ so much? r.~ust we suppose that humans can
only communicate what they know or is it that they can know
only what they are able to communicate about? The basic
issue is the nature of the stpucture of the mind.
Chomsky cites Cudworth and Russe11 t both philosophers,
in presenting his view of the nature of the human mind (1975,
pp. 6-7). His understanding is that the functions of the mind
are biologically determined. We can know so much because, in
a sense, we already knew it. This is not to say that people
are born knowing that the speed of light is 186,000 miles
per second or that the Milwaukee Braves won the World Series
in 1957, but rather that our systems of belief are those
that the mind, as a biological structure, is designed to
8
9construct. (1975. p. 7) It is as if we can know only
what we are biologically permitted to know.
This is easier to picture if one considers the ways
of understanding a thing rather than the mere knowledge of a
thing's existence. The word "chair", for example, is a
single word which could be correctly used to describe any
one of a great number of things which people sit on, or
which resemble things that people sit on. It is specific to
the point that it means something a little different than the
words "stool", "sofa", "lounge" or "love seat", but otherwise
it leaves a great d-eal of information unknown. V/hy can't the
essence of a name for something to sit on include information
as to its size, color, value, position in the room, number of
arms and legs, and the way it makes a person feel when he
sits on it?
Perhaps the lac'k of uniformity of human experience,
in combination with the limitations of the human senses, is
a factor involved in the nature of language structure. We
can' t have one word ~lhich means "blue, high-backed, upholstered
arm chair \'lhich is suitable for read·ing in, is not overly
comfortable, promotes correct posture, and is designated for
use by the head of the household only" for a number of bio-
logical reasons. The eye can detect many variations of the
10
color "bluet. , it would be difficult to gain consensus as to
which variation of blue is the one in question due to
differences in individual capacities to detect color;
differences in size make the term "high-backed'· a relative
one; variations in body shape make moot opinions of reading
suitability, comfort and correct posture; and the question
of who is the head of the household is one that has been a
subject of controversy for ages, perhaps because it is not
sUfficiently determined biologically. The essence of a thing,
for biological as well as psychological and sociological
reasons, can only be agreed upon by humans in the most basic
of criteria. Imagine a species more exactly like each other,
a "homo uniformis" (Aldiss, 1978, p. ll~). Such beings would
not need all the describing, qualifying, and determining
words that we need to understand each other. One utterance,
one name, would contain all the information that such beings
might require.
More basically, the use of utterances is biologically
imposed. We can't read each other's minds with consistency.
Vie could not generate a lan.guage of colors and lights. ·A
language based solely on gesture would tie up our valuable
limbs. A language of musical notes might not be a bio-
logical impossibility, but everyone would have to develop
perfect pitch.
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The structure of languages, all human languages, is a
more controversial and more intrinsic issue to this dis-
cussion than the nature of the physical aspects of language
generation. Why do the parts of speech that we use represent
the relationships that they do? Are there other possible
relationships? It is Chomsky's position that there is a
Universal Grammar which determines these things. (1975, p. 29)
Chomsky feels that the mind has a language faculty, which.
given "appropriate stimulation" (~975, p. 1)) will generate
a grammar, the rules of a l~~guage. Certain of these rules
are said to appear in every language, comprising a body of
common elements, generated by biological necessity, which is
the "essence of human language" (Chomsky, 1975. p. 29).
Considering the number of languages, ancient and modern, East
and \~.est, primitive and advanced, if Chomsky's Universal
Grammar does indeed exist, it would be strong evidence for
the existence of a language faculty of the mind which is
innate.
One of the more easily understood principles of
Universal Grammar is "structure Dependence" (Chomsky, 1975,
p. JJ). Simply stated. "Structure Dependence'· means that
words can only be in certain places in a sentence, or the
meaning is changed •. This principle is very prevalent in
12
English. "John can run." has a different meaning from
"Can John run?" "Run can John••• is meaningless unless one
exercises poetic license. I am suspicious of i t.s applicabil-
ity universally, however. For instance, in Latin the
sentence ttPuer puellam spectat ... means ·'The boy sees the
girl.·t The meaning can be changed to ItThe girls sees the
boy." without moving any of the words, "Pueram puella spectate It
Where'position was used to indicate case in English, suffixes
were used in Latin. Case endings are used to a greater or
lesser degree in Western languages. The fact that the newest
of \vestern l.anguages, English, seems to use them the least
might indicate that humans have been "taught" by their
environment to discard case endings in favor of a greater
degree of structural dependence. If this is true, it would
appear to raise serious questions about Chomsky's theory of
an innate ··Universal Grammar. It
There are logical, if speculative, explanations in
defense of Chomsky. Perhaps humans have changed biologically
as well as socially. We are said to be bigger than our
ancestors. If an innate "language faculty of ·the mind" does
exist, it is not unreasonable to assume that it also has grown
over the centuries. The proposition is not without i~s
1)
humorous aspects. Would this then mean that short people
should speak Latin or Greek? Serously, another explanation
might be that the concept of cases for nouns is an integral
part of Universal Grammar, whether case is designated by
position or ending.
The reader can easily see that the trouble with
Chomsky's theory of language is that it is virtually un-
provable. There might be a Universal Grammar, but its
tenets wO'uld have to be traced through every human language,
with constant adaptation and retracing for each new language
researched. After the completion of such a project, experts
would spend years haggling over the rationale used in each
instance where a partiCUlarly troublesome problem with a
specific language was overcome.
The best aspect of Chomsky's theory is that its .
speCUlative nature gives rise to opportunities for the
reading specialist to ponder over and question his or her
beliefs about the essence of his or her work. Is innateness
any more impro bable than "learning theory"? White rats have
been consistently able to beat college students at maze
running (Chomsky, 1975, p. 19). If learning theory were
correct, would not the humans, being better learners, be
able to learn to beat the rats? Maybe a sense of direction
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in a maze is innate for rats, just as a sense of correctness
in language might be innate for people. Chomsky himself
feels that there is no plausible evidence that language
learning is simply an instance of generalized learning
capacity (1975, pp. 20-21), but he is prone to making
sweeping statements. He later admits that the environment,
people's roles and conditions all also playa part in the
development of linguistic theory (1975, p. 35).
Considering the previously stated purpose of this
paper, further discussion of the particulars of the
innateness hypothesis would not be tlppropriate here due
to lack of usability. It might suffice to say that language,
in the view of psycholinguists, fits people just like bicycles
do (Smith, 1973, p. 4). Chomsky'S influence, however, ex-
tends further. Frank Smith (1973, p. J), cites two Chomskian
influences on linguistic thought: (1) the distinguishing
of surface structure, the order of words in a sentence, and
underlying structure. the essential meaning of a ,sentence,
and (2) the stress on the creative aspects of language, the
infinity of sentences which grammar can generate.
Ruddell (1976, p. 458) proposes that there are five
types of knowledge which every English speaker possesses.
(1) knowledge of the difference between grammatical and non-
grammatical sentences, (2) the knowledge needed to comprehend
different sentences with the same constituent structure,
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(3) the knowledge needed to identify ambiguous sentences with
the same surface structure (i.e. They are frying chickens.),
(4) the understanding of sentences of similar meaning but
different structure (i.e. The girl struck the robber. The
robber waS struck by the girl.), and (5) the knowledge needed
to understand and develop novel sentences. The influence
of Chomsky's ideas is evident. Ruddell's five categories
all deal not with word knowledge but with the knowledge of
the way words fit together. Chomsky's notion of surface
structure might be said to be the relational meaning of
language (Ruddell, 1976, p. 459). In the eyes of both men,
it is significant that English speakers can put words in
the right plac~and know the meanings of the various places
where words might be found.
The surface structure of a sentence is the pattern of
words which the speaker generates in an attempt to communicate.
Where does the meaning come from? What is used to generate
it? What factors are involved in the success or failure of
communication? It would be difficult to argue with the
existence of surface structure. It's there. We can hear it.
We can look at it. As Ruddell points out, we can tell if it's
right or wrong, grammatical or non-grammatical. But the
answers to the above questions are not easily found.
16
Chomsky originally felt that individuals would begin
to communicate by creating a deep structure out of the
meaning that was to be communicated (Goodman, 1976, p. 476).
The existence of this deep structure would activate the use
of the individual's grammar, a device used for generating
sentences (Chomsky, 1961, p. 34). Chomsky suggests that the
use of this grammar is intuitive (Ibid.), and that it works
in a way which is fixed in advance biologically (1961, p. 35).
Goodman gives a more practical and less mysterious suggestion
(1976, p. 476). He feels that a child devises a grammar for
himself which moves toward adult norms. Goodman will admit
that the child learns to become more and more effective,
but insists that the ease with which this effectiveness
comes about is greater t~an can be accounted for by learning
theory (1973, pp. 21-22).
Although somewhat cryptic and difficult to prove, the
allegations of Goodman and Chomsky do not seem unreasonable
upon reflection. I cannot remember ever hearing an infant say
something extremely ungrammatical. I have observed an infant
hold out. her hal1d and say Unle" I meaning "Give it to me.",
but I cannot honestly say I have observed someone say uln
in the same situation. l'To one ever calls an inff:lrlt "melt J
how does it know that that is sometimes its name, and how
does it know which times it J.• - r;;:) .
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A study of infant spe.ech
to detect its approximation of adult grammar would be
illuminating. Such a study would need to use the grammar
that is used by adults, not the formal grammar which is
artificial at times, as a criterion. It might try to
discover the rate at which infants use words in the wrong
order. I would postulate that such a rate would be small,
and would dwindle to near non-existence within a few years
of the onset of speech, despite the constant influx of new
vocabulary.
The magnitude of such a study, which would last for
years and entail detailed scrutiny of countless hours of
utter~ces, is of the same immensity as the task of
proving that a Universal Grammar exists among all languages.
Once again the essentials of la~guage are easily debated
but not easily proven. The consequence is that language
theorists, unhindered by the burden of proof, rely just
as heavily upon insight and reflection as they do upon
observation and experimentation. Part of the appeal of
the psycholing,uistic model of language which arose from
Choms'ky's id eas is that it is less mechanical, less clear-
cut than that of the subs'kill theorists. It is a model which
takes into account the mystery, romance, and creative genius
of human language functioning. It's too bad that the stars
18
were found to be mere balls of flaming gas rather than signs
put in the sky by supernatural beings. The human race can
no longer look up into a rich story book, it can only look
up into scientifically explainable novas, vacuums, and black
holes in the universe. One would hope that, if the ··tele-
scope" which can see into the biology of human thought is
ever developed, it is someday found that the mind ~s able to
create, not merely repeat rote lessons.
Another c'onsequenc e of lack of provability, is that
theor'ies can be modified for reasons other than empirical
evidence. Chomsky has done this with his notion of deep
structure. He has dropped the term altogether. because too
many people interpret.ed ttdeep" as meaning important, in
contrast to superficial (1975, p. 82). As much to emphasize
the importance of surface structure as to provide any new
ideas, Chomsky now feels that meaning activates something
called "initial phrase markers" (1975, p. 81) which are
then transformed by grartunar into surface structure.
"Initial phrase markers" might be thought of as the markers
of the mental position of abstract structures joust as
"surface structure" represents the physical position of
words in a spoken or written sentence (1975, p. 102). For
instance, yes or no questions are created by something
19
Chomsky calls the inversion rule (Ibid.,p. 85). "The man is
here. If becomes "Is the man here?" The initial phrase mar'ker
somehow represents the abstract structure which indicates
whether or not grammar should invert.
I wonder why Chomsky insists on even this extra step.
We can observe surface structure. By its existence we can
logically assume that it is created by a set of rules
called grammar. Because of its relative efficiency, it is
not unreasonable to state that grammar is the tool used to
convey meaning of relationships between the concepts that
words represent. Because humans are biologically limited to
communicating only certain relationships, and qecause they
are so, good at using grammar, we can conclude that grammar
may be biologically innate. But why postulate that ttdeep
structure" or " initial phrase markers' t exist when they are
neither directly observable nor logically essential? Is it
not just as likely that the mind has a thought. and uses
grammar to convert that thought into communicable surface
structure? Using the criteria of worth previously stated
here, I am unable to report any observations of the existence
of a "deep structure". Its existence doe·s not seem necessary
from a common-sense viewpoint, and knowledge of theori~s of
its existence is not usable for the secondary teacher. As
20
will be demons·trated in this paper, a workable understanding
of the nature of the language process and its relationship
to reading can be reached without wrestling with the problem
of what exactly constitutes a "deep structure·t or II initial
phrase marker".
The notion of "qeep structure", however, is often
alluded to, though rarely dwelt upon, by psycholinguists.
For the purposes of this discussion it will be understood
as some sort of intermediate step between the unverbalized
notion and its verbll generation.
Grammar not only generates s~ructure, it interprets
it. Goodman has a simple model of the speaking-listening




The first half of the model represents the process already dis-
cussed here. The speaker has a meaning to be communicated and
processes it, using his or her grammatical rules, into a
spoken phrase or sentence. The listener's side of the model
would appear to be a mirror image of the speaker's, but it isn't.
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The speaker, wanting to be understood, has to be as
exact as possible, both semantically and syntactically, to
reach his or her goal. The listener, on the other hand,
can sample from the cues provided by the speaker and make a
prediction concerning the meaning in question (Goodman, 1976,
p. 477). This prediction is made on the basis of the
listener's knowledge of not only the rules of language but
also the speaker, the subject being discussed, ~d the con-
text of what has already been said (Ibid., p. 478). It
might be said that the listener already has the meaning of
what he is about to hear in mind. The closer the corrobora~
tion between the listener's prediction and the cues which he
or she samples from the speaker's oral output. the more
complete the communication. The above model, then, is
deceiving in that it appears to happen chronologically from
left to right, when actually meaning occurs simUltaneously
in both the speaker's and the listener's minds. The
listener has the responsibility of monitoring speech to
check whether or not the two meanings approximate each other.
For instance. I might ask, t'If you had nothing to do
on a Saturday night, where would you do it?.. The word
"where" most likely would not be consistent with the
listener's prediction of what I was about to ask. Other
questions, such as "With whom?", .tTl1hat?tt, "Why?" or "How?"
22
would be equally plausible. I would probably be asked to
repeat myself. This understanding of listening as a
selective process which involves guessing the next utter-
ance and monitoring the correctness of the guesses is
consistent with reality. The clich~ about people hearing
only what they want to hear is nearly true. Because they
don't listen to every word, people often hear what they
alreaoy expected to hear. The less one knows what to ex-
pect, the more attention one must pay to the speaker, and
the more requests for reiteration one must make. Good
friends and loved ones often unders~and each other with a
minimum of verbal communication because they already know
so muc.h about each other's ways of thinking and speaking.
Consider the opposite situation. in which the
listener knows little about either the speaker or his sub-
ject. How much attention is needed to decode the message?
How much attention does the listener have at his or her
disposal to devote to decoding? LaBerge and Samuels report
that people can pay attention to only one thing at a time.
and that someone who appears to be doing more than one
thing is either shifting attention from one stimulus to
another quickly or is processing well-known information
automatically (1976, pp. 549-550). If Mary is watching
television and I walk in and say ttr'!iss America". she will
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give me a puzzled glance and say "What?" If I walk in and
say ttrlIary. It she will smile and answer "Yes?" Her name is so
well-known to her that she doesn't need to be paying attention
to it to recognize it. According to LaBerge and Samuels, the
mind employs some type of a filter to screen out unwanted
.stimuli and facilitate attention (Ibid.). Only extremely
familiar or predictable stimuli can pass through the filter.
Another factor which affects the listener's compre-
hension is short-term memory_ Short-term memory is a memory
trace that lasts for a maximum of thirty seconds, although
typically for a much shorter period of time (Mussen, Conger,
and Kagan, 1974, p. 286). If oral outp'ut does not match a
listener's predictions, the listener must synthesize a new
prediction based on the cues he or she remembers from the
previous utterances. The most common errors in short-term
memory arise from confusion between sounds (Anderson, Goldberg,
and Hidde, 1976, p.• 580), so the listener is trying to make
sense from an incomplete set of cues, some of which may have
been mistaken for similar sounding cues, which are constantly
being forgotten and replaced by new cues in short-term memory.
The ease with which this happens might be further evidence
for the "innateness" hypothesis.
To summarize the understanding of the language process
presented here, people have a natural affinity for language
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use. The ease with which they deal with the relationships
between words leads psycholinguists to believe that certain
aspects of grammar are the result of biological necessity,
not of learned social expediency. People use this knowledge
of grammar not only to generate sentences, but also to guess
the meaning of sentences about to be communicated and to
monitor the correctness of the guesses. Although reading is
not exactly the same as speaking, many aspects of the two
processes are analogous, as will be shown in the next chapter.
CHAPTER III
PSYCHOLINGUISTIC MODELS OF READING
"Reading is a secondary linguistic activity that
relies critically upon the reader's awareness of speaking
and listening (primary activities)." (Mattingly, 1972,
p. 133) This understanding of the reading process, which
is shared by most influential psycholinguists, clarifies
the need for the reading specialist to understand the
nature of language. Indeed, much of what will be said
about the reading process here will parallel what was said
in the previous chapter concerning language.
Certain specific linguistic skills have been found
to be good predictors of a child's readiness to begin
reading. Goldstein (1976, p. 680) reports two behaviors
which change between the ages of five and seven and play a
role in learning to reoad. The first is sequential memory,
the ability to remember order. The second is word analysis-
synthesis skill. Goldstein describes this as sensitivity
to the properties of spoken words, the ability to break
25
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spoken words into syllables or phonemes, and the ability to
guess a spoken word from· ''lord segments?
Savin (1973, PP. 319-322) cites similar skills in
discussing the characteristics of children who have trouble
learning to read. These children are insensitive to rhyme
and beginning consonant similarities, and are unable to
learn pig-latin. Pig-latin? The ability to use this child's
play code may be more significant than it at first appears.
The way the code works seems simple; the first letter of
each word is moved to the end of the word where a new
syllable is created by adding an "aU to it. Words which
begin with a vowel are altered by adding "hey". "How are
you?" becomes Owhey arehey, ouyey?ft To be proficient in
this "language ft one must be aware of initial sounds, final
sounds and the diffel"ence between a vowel and a consonant.
The problem that certain children have with learning
pig-latin is that words are used to communicate meaning and
are thus thought of only in units which convey meaning.
The initial or final sound of a word does not convey any
meaning (with the exception of a few affixes), so the child
is not aware of it as a discreet unit. A child does not
learn fttTL'llllltt and tt ah·'; he or she learns the meanil).gful unit
"rna'· • Only in the most abstract and poetic of definitions
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could those two sounds be said to have meanings which "add up"
to mean mother, so, as language units, the existence of the
two sounds which are the phonological components of "matt
probably does not occur to the child.
To learn to read, however, the child must deal with
letters, visual Q~its as intrinsically meaningless as phono-
logical units. This trick requires something referred to as
semantic or linguistic awareness (Mattingly. 1972). This
awareness varies. Some people pun, alliterate, assonate, or
create acronyms; others simply don't care (Ibid., p. 140).
A child who can converse in pig-lat~~, then, has that skill
of analysis which is needed to understand the way letters
operate. First graders are drilled in rhyme and alliteration,
yet some have difficulty with reading from the start. This
suggested to Savin (1973, p. )24) that problem readers do not
learn linguistic awareness from traditional first grade
phonics drills.
Goldstein (1976) found that word analysis-synthesis, a
skill which reflects linguistic awareness, is a good predictor
of acheivement in reading training among four-year-olds. He
tested twenty-seven four-year-olds for the skill by showing
them pictures of familiar objects and pronouncing them both
normally and broken into syllables (i.e. kangaroo and kan-ga-roo).
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After four sessions of eight words each in which the subjects
were asked to repeat after the experimenter, the test was
given, in which the subjects were asked to pronounce the
words "funny like I did" without being prompted by the ex-
perimenter. After testing, instruction was given ten minutes
a day for thirteen weeks in letter recognition and sound-
letter correspondence. A significant positive correlation
between achievement in the instruction and analysis-synthesis
skill as shown by the· test was found. In other words, subjects
j
who could divide words into syllables orally were better at
learning the names and sounds of written letters. Although
his experiment was not designed to test for it, Goldstein
felt that this skill could be taught and that instruction
should not be delayed on the assumption that the skill was
maturational. Whether linguistic awareness is learned or
developmental, the important thing here is to understand
that it is awareness of the artificial aspects of words. If
we never wrote, we would never need to be aware of sound-
letter correspondences.
Among more mature readers, the effect of the arti-
ficiality of the written word lessens. Single letters can't
be identified faster than four or five per second (Smith,
197), p. 78). If adults had to read at that rate they
wouldn't. Adults revert to letter-by-letter or syllable-by-
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syllable reading only as a last resort, after sight vocabulary,
gestalt understanding, and context clues have already failed
(Ibid., p. 121). As the reader becomes more proficient,
reading more nearly approximates the comm~~ication process
described in the second chapter.
There is some controversy over whether the reader
hears language while he or she reads. Goodman insists that
recoding visual inp'ut int9 phonological input is too slow,
and that the rapid rate of proficient readers is evidence
that sUQvQcablization is unnecessary (Goodman, 1976, p. 503).
Smith and Holmes agree that it is not logically necessary for
a reader to~ to listen to him or herself (1973, p. 6J)
and point out that we remember meanings, not words (Ibid., p. 61).
Yet there is some evidence that subvocalization not
only'occurs, but is more efficient for most people than direct
processing from visual codes.
Conrad (1972) reports a number of experiments in which
electrical activity was detected in speech-related muscles
during reading. This articulation or subvocalization, he
says, increases as the difficulty of the material being read
increases (Ibid., po 210). Some experimenters have condi-
tioned subjects to read without articulation, but, according
to Conrad (Ibid.), some studies suggest that when articulation
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is suppressed, short-term memory suffers.
Related research has been done among deaf readers.
The average deaf fifteen-year-old has the vocabulary of the
average hearing nine-year-old (Conrad, 1972, p. 226).
Although deaf and hearing children are about equal in
memory of shapes, the deaf are clearly inferior in memory of
verbal material (Ibid.). These findings might indicate that
indeed the fluent reader translates the visual code of the
printed word into a phonological code before dealing with
its meaning. Deaf and hearing sUbjects remembered nameless
things with equal alacrity, yet words, which have phono-
logical correlates, were more easily remembered by those who
had heard those correlates. If the hearing subjects were not
using some sort of phonological code, then why the signifi-
cantly better- performance? Among the deaf there .are those
who read well, so it may be possible for individuals to rely
solely on the visual code for short-term memory (Conrad, 1972,
pp. 230-231). still it would seem a safe bet, based on the
findings reported above, that people who have used language
continue to use the same codes that have worked well for them
in oral communication, to understand written coommunication.
Explanations have been given to answer the criticism
that the phonological codes are too slow to provide for the
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rate of fluent readers. Conrad suggested that it is possible
to ima.gine silent speech faster than speech can be vocalized
(1972, p. 207). Mattingly asks why the hardest sentences to
understand are usually the ones which are the most aw"kward
to say, unless they are first translated into the phono-
logical code (1972, p. 143). Conrad's most intriguing ex-
planation is that perhaps during fast reading it's not more
words that are subvocalized but better words (1972, p. 210).
This theory is consistent with the model of communication
featured in the first chapter, since it provides for an
active listener-reader who chooses from among the available
words the ones which he feels will best help him guess the
meaning.
If we concede that the reader is at least thinking
about the phonological correlates of the visual clues pre-
sented in the form of written w~s, then the effect of the
artificiality of visual clues, and strategies used by the
proficient reade·r to overcome that art.ificiality are of
concern. Kolers (1973) cites 'research indicating that,
when presented very briefly, words are easier to recognize
than letters. This may me·an that , although the linguistic
awareness referred to earlier is instrumental in the
initial learning of reading, proficient readers revert to
)2
recognizing words rather than letters because it is a closer
approximation of spoken language. Goodman (1973) points
out that partial, blurred, or even mutilated graphic input
is usable by the proficient reader. These findings con-
cerning letter and word recognition were corroborated in a
review of research by Smith and Holmes (1973) who found
that neither the recognition of individual letters nor that
of individual words is needed for comprehension to happen.
It was found that one cannot see a visual configuration as
both a group of letters and as a word at the same time
(Smith and Holmes, 1973, p. 55). If this is true, it would
seem obvious that a proficient reader would not "see" the
letters of a word unless he or she became confused to the
point where reading rate had slowed to less than language
usage speed.
It may be more difficult for the ~eader to accept
the assertion that the identification of individual words
is not needed for comprehension. The explanation lies in
the psycholinguists' understanding of the role of the
reader's knowledge of both grammar and the subject of the
material being read. Kolers (1973, PP. 37-39) cites re-
search in the types of mistakes made during oral reading.
This type of study, which has had a spate of popUlarity,
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is usually called "miscue analysis." Kolers found that when
an oral reader would substitute an incorrect word for a word
which appeared on the page, 75% of the substitutions would be
of the same part of speech as the original word. Kolers felt
that this phenomenon indicated a greater sensitivity to the
grammatical relations of the word to its context than to the
word itself (Ibid., p. 42). In other words it appeared to
Kolers that the readers were guessing or anticipating which
words would follow on the basis of their knowledge of grammar.
William D. Page (1976) conducted an experiment in
which a distinction was made between acceptable and un-
acceptable oral errors. The acceptable errors were those
which were either syntactically or semantica.lly similar to
the correct word. His hypothesis was that the type of oral
errors made by his subjects would predict comprehension
scores. He found that the unacceptable oral errors were
significant predictors. The subjects with the greatest
number of unacceptable errors were those whose scores on a
close test were lowest. Goodman (1976, pp. 499-501) felt
that miscues reveal the strategies used by the reader, and
that a linguistically aware teacher could analyze them for
informal diagnostic purposes. He also warned that insisting
on precision could cause a reader to decode at a shallower
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level (graphic-symbolic rather than grammatical) and thus
lose the natural flow of the language process.
In addition to grammatical awareness, the reader
brings his knowledge of the topic into play while "guessing"
at the meaning of written words. Broo'ks and others (1977)
point out that such psychologists as Piaget and Ausubel
have long emphasized the importance of previously assimilated
information and ideas in the learning of new facts and con-
cepts.
According to Smith (1973, p. 75) there is substantial
evidence that meaning is employed b~,.. proficient readers to
minimize the amount of visual information needed to identify
words In meaningful and predictable sequences. Although it
would seem that Smith is refering simply to the use of con-
text to aid in word identification. this writer feels that
the same process may be involved in idea identification. A
reader reads everything in the context of his own prior ex-
perience with the subject of the writing he is dealing with.
"The meaning that a reader will eventually derive originates
in his head, not on the page." (Goodman, 1973, p. 22). It
does not necessarily follow that all readers know where the
meaning comes from. In the course of experimenting with the
reading rates of gifted children, McCracken (1960, p. 397)
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found that these young readers were reluctant to believe
that meaning comes from within the reader or even that
reading is primarily the getting of meaning. It would be
interesting to study not only how much better proficient
read·ers are at using prior knowledge to attain meaning,
but also whether awareness of the use of experience improves
comprehension. It would seem likely that experiential or
contextual awareness could be added to linguistic awareness
and grammatical awareness as a necessity for quality reading
to occur.
Jenkins and Russell report on three interesting ex-
periments dealing with the importance of prior knowledge in
reading (1976). At first they concocted an imaginary machine
that played baseball called "Tarup". t'Tarup I sft eyes ,vere
called ItKupod It • It used its "flIedon" for throwing, its
tlGoken tt for catching and its ttLatuk tt to bat. The subjects,
college sophomores, were divided into experimental groups
according to the type of prior knowledge they received.
One group was taught the meanings of the names of uTarup's"
parts; a second was merely familiarized with the pronuncia-
tions of the terms, and a third and fourth read passages
unrelated to "Tarup" and VoJere used as controls. The sub jects
then read a passage dealing with the history, manufacture,
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cost, repair, and marketing of ttTarup" and took a test on the
material. It was found that those who either knew a little
about "Tarup" or 'Ilere even merely familiar with the pronuncia-
tion of the vocabulary did significantly better on the test
than the control groups. Fearing that the experiment might
have been effected by the essential meaninglessness of
"Tarup", Jenkins and Russell conducted a similar experiment
using the more pertinent topic of heart abnormalities. In
this second experiment, the group which had received meaning
training in the vocabulary did better than the group which
had merely become familiar with the terms, but the results
were not clear-cut enough to satisfy the experimenters so a
third 'experiment was designed. This time the ttmeaning group"
learned significantly more than the familiarization group.
Jenkins and Russell had some reservations about
asserting that prior knowledge was the only variable involved
in learning. They pointed out that for passages which con-
tained many "conceptual anchors", explanations of the con-
cepts basic to the passage, the effect of the meaning-training
they gave their subjects was not as significant. still, in
the context of the model of reading being presented here,
conceptual anchors themselves could be regarded as prior
knowledge. Prior knowledge could have been assimilated last
year or last sentence.
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The profile of the proficient reader which is be-
coming apparent here is one of a very active t aggress"ive
language user. The reader brings to the material to be read
a knowledge of the grammatical rules used to write the mater-
ial and of the extent of his or her own familiarity with the
subject of the material. The reader can then use these tools
to extract the amount of meaning he or she requires as quickly
as possible, using as few clues as necessary. The final
question to be answered to complete this model of reading is
the question of certainty. How can the reader be so sure
that his or her guesses are correct? The process by which a
reader becomes certain that his interpretation of what he has
read is correct is sometimes called monitoring (Brooks and
others, 1977, p. 151). It is felt that the reader slows down
or even regresses to previously-read sentences as doubt about
the correctness of his or her guesses grows.
It is the nature of written language that scrutiny is
facilitated. A written message holds conveniently still, in-
viting the reperusal of the reader if it is needed. Goodman
(1976, p. 483) feels that readers make use of this character-
istic of written language to cycle back for more clues when
the original clues do not sufficiently minimize any doubts
the reader might have about the meaning. In reading, the
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language user does not need to ask for repetition, if he or
she is successfully monitoring, the reader can repeat a series
of clues to himself until it makes sense.
We now have a complete model of the reading process.
The reader does no·t read every word. Certain words are read.
They are chosen according to criteria which exist within
the reader's innate understanding of grammar. The reader
then guesses what the total message is, using both knowledge
of grammar and of the topic to facilitate the guess. If the
guess makes sense, the reader moves on. anticipating the
meaning of the next group of words. If not, the reader
slows down or cycles back to minimize doubt concerning the
message. Only when the reader is reading extremely unfamiliar
or grammatically difficult messages does he or she slow do~m




There has been, in the eyes of this researcher, an
outstripping of experimentation by theory in the area of
psycholinguistic models of reading. The nature of the
ideas of Chomsky, Goodman, Smith and their supporters is
one which invites reflection. This reflection supplements
or complements the original ideas but does little to prove
them. As was mentioned earlier in this paper, the issue of
the exact workings of the reading process may be an unprov-
able one given the lack of a means of directly observing
thought processes. Still a practitioner in the field of
read ing pedagogy, loo'king for a basic explanation of the
process he or she deals with daily, needs some concrete
corroboration of a theory before becoming comfortable with
it.
For this reason I designed a simple, informal ex-
periment to investigate certain facets of the model of
39
40
reading proposed in the last chapter. Because of the
diminutive scope and personal nature of the following, none
of theresults can be considered as demonstrations of ultimate
truths. Still the tendencies which are brought to light
should yield fuel for further discussion.
Three hypotheses were tested by the experiment:
1) That better readers will prove to be better guessers of
the meaning of written material which has been presented
in partial form.
2) That better readers will make b3tter use of prior knowledge.
3) That better readers will choose more significant words
when asked to monitor and check their guesses.
Procedure
The population used for this experiment was selected
from among the freshman and sophomore classes at Hartland
Arrowhead High School, Hartland, Wisconsin. The subjects
chosen were separated into two groups. One group, which
will be referred to as the "Reading Group, ft was compr"ised
of students from the freshman reading class. Only stu-
dents whose reading scores are among the bottom 20% of in-
coming freshmen's scores are counselled to register for this
class. Within this group of 41 were two exceptions to the
above definition: one student who was a sophomore new to the
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district with poor reading scores on his record, and one
student whose scores were above the 20% mark, but whose
parents felt that reading instruction would be more bene-
ficial than the English course offered as an alternative.
The other group, which will be referred to as the
"Lit Group," was comprised of students from two sectons
of a class known simply as ttSophomore Literature". To have
been in "Sophomore Literature" at the time of this experi-
ment these students would have already been through 'tFresh-
man Literature, It ftlntroduction to Composition't and
"Speech", and not have been in a Freshman Reading class.
Two of the 51 subjects in this group did not fit the above
de'finition, but were former reading students who had de-
cided to see if they could handle the reading load of a Lit
course.
The rationale for choosing these two groups was a
simple one. I wanted two groups who were not only of
different reading ability, but who were also at variance in
the amount of experience each had had with literature in
general and specifically with the Short story as a literary
genre. The Lit Group, in addition to being better readers as
measured by placement test and more voracious readers as ob-
served by their teacher (the author), received in Freshman
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Lit instruction in poetry, mythology, and the short story.
The Reading Group had had some exposure to short stories
and drama but had spent the greater portion of their high
school careers studying specific techniques· for following
directions, using context clues, dealing with reading
assignments, and distinguishing fact from opinion.
The instrument used for this experiment was fashioned
from the first three paragraphs of Ernest Hemingway's short
story Bi~ Two-Hearteq River. (Hemingway. 1972). The para-
graphs were retyped with blank spaces inserted where
Hemingway's words had been omitted. Words were omitted
which wer~ not critical to the meaning of the main clause of
each sentence. Words which referred to the information in
the previous sentence were omitted. Words which caught my
eye, either because they were large, unusual in appearance,
or in an important-looking place in the physical layout of
the sentence, (in my estimation) were left on the page.
The method used to create the instrument may at first
seem arbitrary. Still, considering the ideas of Kenneth
Goodman and a hope for future usability of the method as an
informal inventory or teaching technique, my presumptuo.us
use of my intuition might prove to be not without relevance.
An important facet of Goodman's understanding, as has already
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been discussed here, is his feeling that good readers are good
at guessing a meaning from a minimal number of clues. Implicit
to this idea must be a skill shared by good readers for recog-
nizing and locating the clues which will prove to be the mini-
mal clues. In other words, a good reader, due to his or her
natural affinity for grammar, knows where to look for the
most important words in a sentence before actually seeing any
of the words. A reading teacher ought to be a good reader;
therefore I felt justified in using my own criteria for the
creation of the instrument.
The paragraphs were also shortened for three reasons.
The first was my concern about the difficulty of the task.
I did not want to exasperate my sUbjects into quitting.
Secondly, I wanted to keep the size of the paragraphs rela-
tively constant so that they could be more easily compared.
Finally, the total experiment had to be administered to each
of the groups in one forty-minute period. As it turned out,
I often needed the full period to guide the subjects through
to completion. The sentences deleted from the end of each
paragraph contained supportive details, which, although con-
tributing factors to the style and tone of the piece, con-
tained no information vital to the understanding of the sUb-
sequent paragr.aph.
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Why Hemingway? His style is nothing if not terse and
direct. Hemingway could be trusted to not attempt to confuse
readers with some convaluted sentence structure. Even the
. longest sentence in the instrument, the first of the third
paragraph, offers its information in a logical and easily
understood manner. The only vocabulary difficulty which
arose was the meaning of log-spiles or piles, and I announced
its meaning to each group to keep all things as equal as
possible. Using a literary example, I was able to use the
instrument as a teaching aid in my Lit classes. A final
important factor was that none of ti,e subjects had read
Big Two-Hearted River.
I administered the experiment by first announcing to
each class that I had recently read that good readers are
good at guessing meanings without reading all the words and
that I wanted to test the idea. Each subject was given a
copy of the instrument. I asked the subjects to try to guess
what the first paragraph was about as completely as possible,
and to write their guesses below the paragraph. Although I
counselled the sUbjects to avoid worrying about word-far-word
guessing, I also stressed that I wanted them to guess all the
ideas possible.
When it became apparent that all had completed the
first tas'k, I asked the subjects to put an 'x' or a chec'k
45
mark in each of five blank spaces which represented words
which would be the most helpful in checking to see if the
guesses were correct. This ta~k was at first a little con-
fusing and a number of examples were given to each class.
("For instance, if you thought the first blank space repre-
sented a very important word you would put a check there.'t)
After completion of the second task, I read the exact
wording of the paragraph aloud. This was done to supply the
subjects with prior knowledge which theoretically should
have made the guessing of the second paragraph easier than
that of the first. The above steps were then repeated for
the second and third paragraphs.
In order to score the instrument, each paragraph was
broken down into its component ideas. This was done by
grouping blank spaces around the words which were given that
would most likely give clues to the meaning of that part of
the sentence. For instance. train up track
(The train went on up the track••• ) naturally coheres as one
idea. Prepositional phrases often formed such idea units, as
did kernel sentences, basic subject verb messages. In some
cases such idea units were split when it became apparent
that many subjects had only guessed part of the idea.
The requests for words to monitor the guesses were
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tallied according to the part of speech requested. For
instance, the Reading Group requested action verbs 28 times.
All raw scores were converted to percents so that the two
groups could be compared.
Results
The results of the experiment can be seen in Tables
1-4. Tables 1, 2, and 3 represent the performance of the
sUbjects at guessing the main ideas of each of the three
paragraphs. Each table shows both the raw score of the number
of students who guessed each item correctly and the percentage
of each experimental group which gUf~ssed each i tern correctly.
For example, in Table 1, it can be discerned that )1 members
of the, Reading Group guessed that Hemingway VJrote "The train
went on up the trac'k ••••• or at least guessed that that idea
was in the paragraph. It can also be seen that the raw score
of 31 represents 75.6% of the total Reading Group of 41 mem-
bers. That percentage can then be compared to the percentage
of the total Lit Group which guessed that idea, in this case
78.4%. Percentages were more meaningful than raw scores in
comparing the groups to each other because the groups were
not equal in number. At the bottom of each table is shown
the average number of students from each group which guessed
each item as ,~ell as the average percent of students which
guessed each item correctly. For instance, on Table 1
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each item was guessed correctly by an average of eight mem-
bers of the Reading Group or about 20% of that group. The
standard deviation from each average is also given.
The significance of the differences between the per-
centages of correct guesses of each group was found by
calculating the t-scores for each difference. The writer
also calculated t-scores for the differences between each
group's subsequent performances from one paragraph to the
next.
Although the Lit Group achieved a higher average per
cent of correct guesses in paragraph one than the Reading
Group, the difference between the two averages was found to
be insignificant at the .05 level. However, in paragraph
two the difference between the averages of the two groups
was found to be significant at the .• 05 level and in para-
graph three, the level of significance jumped to the .005
level.
TABLE la
PERFOR~!ANCE AT GUESSING lVIJ.. IN IDEAS IN .PARAGRAPH Or~E
The out around of burnt Nick of the
train of one of timber sat canvas baggage
IDEA went sight the on a and man had
up the hills bundle bedding pitched
track
Reading )1 5 11 21 15 9 5group
raw score
% of group 75.6 12.2 26.8 51.2 36.6 22.0 12.2
Lit group 40 9 20 21 15 14 8raw score
% of group 78.4 19.8 39.2 41.2 29.4 27.5 1?6
TABLE Ib























group 0 8 0 0 0 0
raw score
% of group 0.0 19.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Lit group 7 25 4 1.5 5 2raw score
% of group 13.7 49.0 7.8 29.4 9.8 ).9
Average number of correct guess.es/i tern I Reading group 8.08 S.D. 9.17
Lit group 1;.69 S.D. 10.79
..A.verage % of correct guesses/item; Reading group 19.70 S.D, 22.38
Lit group 28.21 S.D. 19.58
TABLE 2a
PERFORr\~ANCE AT GUESSIN"G rtlAIN IDEAS IN PARAGRAPH TV/O
Nic'k at the he had the of then The It against
loo"ked burnt- expected scattered the wal"ked river swirled log




15 1.5group JJ 31 17 1 2 27 11
raw score
% of group 81.9 75 0 6 41.5 2.4 4.9 6.5.8 36.6 36.6 26.8
Lit group 43 39 24 1 9 45 22 24 2.5raw scores
% of group 84.3 76.5 47.1 2.9 17.6 88.2 43.2 47.0 49.0
TABLE 2b
PERFORlvIANCE AT GUESSING MAIN IDEAS IN PARAGRAPH Tt,vO
of the Nic'k colored and 'keeping in the with
bridge looked from the '-latched themselves current wavering
IDEA down into 'pebbly the steady fins.
the water bottom trout (bodies)
Reading
group 12 10 11 20 7 7 J
raw score
%of group 29.3 24.4 26.8 48.9 17.1 17.1 7.3
Lit group 22 38 31 ;8 10 18 8raw score
% of group 43.2 74.5 60.8 74.5 19.6 35.3 15.6
Average number of correct guesses/item. Reading group 13.88 S.D, 9.47
Lit group 24.81 S.D. 13.02
Average % of correct guesses/itema Reading group 33.94 S.D. 23.35
Lit group 48.71 S.D. 2.5.59
TABLE Ja
PERFORIv1ANCE AT GUESSING rJiAIN IDEAS IN PARAGRAPH THREE
He their into the many fast- slightly far down
watched noses current trout moving distorted through
thenl in deep water as he the glassy(trout) watched convex
surface
Reading
group 11 17 14 20 0 9 6
raw scores
%of group 26.8 41.5 36.1 48.8 0.0 22.0 14.6
Lit group 46 38 37 38 1 JJ 36raw scores
% of group 90.2 74.5 72.5 74.5 1.9 64.7 70,6
TABLE 3b
PERFORMANCE AT GUESSING MAIN IDEAS IN PARAGRAPH THREE
of the its smooth of the of the at the were the
pool surface against log-driven bridge bottom big trout.




group a 4 4 1 2 6 8
raw scores
% of gro'up 0,0 9.8 9.8 2.4 4.9 14.6 19.5
Lit group a 2.5 21 22 19 25 29ra'vv scores
% of group 0.0 49.0 41.2 43.2 37.3 49.0 58.8
Average number of correct guesses/itemt Reading group 7.29 S.D. 6.07
Lit group 26.43 S.D. 12.97
Average % of correct guesses/item: Reading group 17.91 S.D. 14',9Lit group 51.96 S.D. 25. 7
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The Reading Group improved its guessing in paragraph
two. In paragraph one an average of 8.08 members of the
Reading Group guessed each item correctly, while in para-
graph two the average jumped to 13.88. This difference was
found to be insignificant at the .05 level. The average
for paragraph three was 7.29, a drop in performance which
was found to be statistically significant at the 0025 level.
The Lit Group improved significantly in paragraph
two; the difference in performance was found to be signifi-
cant at the .01 level. Although there was an improvement
in the Lit Group's performance in paragraph three, the
difference in performance between paragraph's two and three
was not significant at the .05 level.
Table 4 represents the words requested for monitoring,
categorized by parts of speech. The first two columns con-
tain the raw scores which represent the number of times that
a subject checked a blank space where the part of speech in
question had b·een omitted, and the percent of the total
number of requests made which that raw score represents.
For example, blanks where action verbs had been omitted
were checked 28 times by the Reading Group, and that number
was 9.5% of the total of 295 requests made by the Reading
TABLE 4




Action Verb Raw Score 28 35 6.0 Group A
% of total 9.5 6.2 5.1choices No significant
Nouns and Raw 53 92 18.0 differences
Pronouns % 17.9 16.4 16.2 found here.
Prepositions Raw 81 155 29.0
% 27.5 27.6 24.7
Helping . Ra¥1 12 2) 4.0
Verbs % 4.1 4.1 3.4
Adjectives Raw 10 40 7.0 Group% 3.4 7.1 6.0 B
Adverbs Raw 17 27 10.0 No significant
% 5.8 4.8 8.5 differencesfound here.
SUbordinating
Conjunction Ra\v 11 15 4.0
and Relative % 3.7 2.7 3.4
Pronouns Group C
Linking Verbs Raw 14 18 3.0
% 4.7 3.2 2.6 No significant
Coordinating Raw 14 25 5.0 differences
Conj,unctions % 4.7 4.5 4.3 found here.
Articles Raw 55 1)2 31.0
% 17.9 23.5 26.4
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Group. The third column, labelled "Chance", represents the
number of times that the part of speech in question had
been omitted. For instance, there were six blanks on the
instrument where action verbs had been omitted, and that
number is 5.1% of the total of 117 blank spaces.
The parts of speech were grouped by the experimenter.
Group A represents the parts of speech which, in my estima-
tion, were the most critical in discerning the meaning of
the ideas in the paragraphs. Considering clauses and
phrases to be the basic idea units of the sentences in the
instrument, I placed nouns, pronouns, action verbs and
helping verbs in this group because they are used to relay
critical bits of information about those units. Preposi-
tions were added to Group A because of the myriad of rela-
tionships which they can convey. A preposition can place a
noun in any of a number of contradictory positions.
Group B consists of enhancers, words which make the
meaning of an idea unit deeper or richer, yet are not
necessarily intrinsic to the meaning of that unit. The
reader might wonder why prepositions were not included in
this second group, since prepositional phrases usually act
as adjectives or adverbs. My feeling was that a preposition
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is more potent because it represents a relationship which
governs a number of words. For instance, in the phrase
"under the green and yellow sea, II "under·' is second. in
importance only to ttsea".
The final group, Group C, consists of words which
are not meaningless but which signify relationships which
exist outside of the meanings of the phrases and clauses of
a sentence. As long as words are in the correct order,
linking verbs represent only shades of meaning. "I am
blue.", ttl look blue.", "I feel blue.", and ttl seem blue.",
all carry'the same basic message. Articles represent only
the difference between the general and the specific (ttThe
train" or "A train"). Independent clauses and ideas in a
series exist with or without coordinating conjunctions.
Because of the positions of words, it could be inferred that
a dependent clause refers to what it refers to if the reader
takes the meaning of the clause into account, without sub-
ordinating conjunctions. For instance, in the sentence "Vie
giggled as we crept down the hall. tt, an al.ert reader could
easily infer that the giggling and the creeping were rela-
tively simultaneous Vii thout the word It as" • Relativa pronouns
were included in this tally because they also mark the
beginnings of dependent clauses.
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It may be that some readers would take issue with
the criterion used to form Groups A, B, and C. Unfortun-
ately the results of the experiment render the issue moot.
No significant difference was found between the performances
of the Reading and Lit Groups in any of the Groups A, B, or
C. No significant difference was found between either
group's performance and chance. In fact it was found that
the parts of speech could not be grouped in any way to rend~r
a significant difference.
Interpretation
Two hypotheses would seem to be upheld by the results
.
of this experiment. First, the hypothesis that better readers
are actually better guessers is supported. For each para-
graph the Lit Gro'up achieved a higher percentage of correct
guesses than the Reading Group. For paragraphs two atld three
this difference was found to be statistically significant. It
can be postulated that the sparse sentence style and journal-
istic vocabulary of Hemingway minimized the effect of read-
ability. Still, if this experiment were to be replicated
under more formal conditions, the instrument CQuld have been
tested to insure that neither group had an advantage due to
familiarity with the subject matter or the vocabulary.
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An important question which immediately arises is,
ltV/hat enables the good readers to be good guessers?" Is it
a better understanding of grammar which helps them to know the
probabilities that certain types of words appear in certain
places? Is it a deeper interaction with vocabulary which
gives them an intuition for the meaning of a sentence? Is
it that they bring more of their prior knowledge of the
subject to bear when they assimilate new knowledge?
Within the confines of this experiment the third
hypothesis would seem to be the most li'kely • Although the
Lit Group did better with the first paragraph than the
Reading Group, it was not until both groups had gained some
prior knowledge (i.e. they each had the first paragraph read
to them)that the difference in performance became statisti-
cally significant. The Lit Group's performance in the
second paragraph was significantly better than its performance
in the first. Its performance continued to improve in the
third paragraph. The Reading Group, on the other hand,
showed no significant improvement between the first ~~d
second paragraphs and actually performed at a significantly
poorer level in the third paragraph.
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It would seem that the Lit Group applied the knowl-
edge it gained in the first paragraph to its task of
guessing the second paragraph. In other words, the better
readers were thinking about Nick, who had been dropped off
with his baggage in a burnt-down town, while the poorer
readers approached the second paragraph as if they were
starting fresh. If one thinks about a burnt-down town, it
is not difficult to guess what a visitor would expect to
see and what he would really see. If one knows that a char-
acter wal'ks down to a river, one can narrow for himself the
possibilities of what that character will do or see next.
Perhap~ the better readers had the knack for placing them-
selves within the milieu of the story, a talent for empathy.
Regardless of what it is called, experience, prior knowledge,
or empathy, this experimenter felt that the results indicate
more thought about what was happening on the part of the
better readers.
Why is this so? Perhaps the poorer readers were just
simply not as interested. Maybe they are by nature or have
become by nurture less inquisitive. It is possible that it
is more difficult to stimulate their intellects, to pique
their intere$. It is also possible that, after a slow start
in reading, the poorer reader is so barraged by remediation of
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subskill deficiencies that he or she regards reading as a
computer-like decoding of individual words rather than as
a flow of ideas.
The above editorial comment was of course only
stimulated by the results of the experiment, not directly
inferred. still, there is some evidence here that in-
struction of poor readers at the high school level might
well emphasize ways to ponder material during reading.
Teachers might model this behavior during oral reading by
stopping often to discuss what is going on in the piece
being read. Students who have spent a lot of time in reading
labs or in remedial reading programs are at times more con-
cerned with the quantity of their work rather than the
quality of their understanding. How many times are student·s
rewarded for finishing a number of workbook pages rather
than for showing interest or making inquiries? Just
because it is difficult to measure a student's intellectual
involvement in what he or she is reading, should we abandon
our pedagogic concern for thinking and teach things which
are easier to test?
One hypothesis was not upheld by the results of this
experiment. It was not .demonstrated here that better
readers are better at monitoring their guesses. In fact
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no significant difference could be found among the words
chosen for monitaring purposes by ei'ther group or by
chance.
Several .explanations for the failure of this hypothesis
to be borne out are possible. It is possible that the nature
of the task was so artificial that the subjects did not
know how to deal with it. It is possible that monitoring
is not done by focusing on certain words but is done by
peripheral vision. In other words the reader may have a
relatively large area of the page in his field of vision
although he or she is only focused on a specific small
group of words. If this is the case then monitoring might
be a more general, vague sort of process than this experi-
menter' assumed it to be. It might also be that each invidual
has his or her own set of criteria for deciding what is
important. If this were the case, an individual's choices for
monitoring might vary significantly from chance, but a group
of readers using divergent criteria would compile what
seemed to be a random set of responses. Further study might
clarify the process of monitoring, if indeed it does exist.
If one compares the results of this experiment to
the psycholinguistic models of reading discussed in Chapter
III, correlations are found. The results tend to support
the notion that good readers read only part of what is
6)
printed and make reasonably accurate guesses concerning
the rest. At least it was demonstrated here that they £gll
guess meaning when words are omitted. Whether they
actually do this, focusing on a few words and ignoring
others, was not shown. still, if a reader has this
ability why would he or she not use it?
The factor of time was not dealt with. Future
experiments might attempt to learn whether good readers
would lose comprehension of paragraphs altered in a similar
fashion to the ones used here as the time allowed to
complete the reading was shortened. Such performance
could be compared to the performanc& of similar reade·rs
on unaltered paragraphs in similar time allotments. I
would hypothesize that performance with altered paragraphs
would approach and possibly exceed performance with un-
altered paragraphs as the time allowed to complete the
reading became increasingly short. This type of result
would further bolster "psycholinguistic guessing game tt
theories since it would show that guessing can be equally
or more efficient than word-far-word reading. Of course
efficiency is a dangerous word since good reading as
discussed here is not so much an efficient assimilation
of data as a thought-provo·king interaction with data.
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The results of this experiment also concur with
psycholinguistic models of reading in the emphasis on the
importance of prior knowledge in the guessing performance
of good readers. That the good readers of this study
performed significantly better after they had been given
some prior knowledge abo'ut what was happening in the second
and third paragraphs, while the poorer readers did not,
suggests that s'kill in the use of logic and knowledge of
probabilities and relationships may be tools needed for
the construction of understanding. Further study might
focus on teaching problem readers how to guess the message
of a se~tence yet-to-be-read, based on the information
already given. Students could be taught to use context
clues with the body of their experiences as the context
from which to draw clues to the meaning of ideas, not just
of words. This type of instruction could be compared to a
program of developmental instruction. I would hypothesize
that for students in grades 6-12 the ttlife context" type of
instruction would prove more beneficial.
The experiment shed no light on the theory that good
reading includes monitoring of guesses to insure correctness •.
Still the idea does not sound unreasonable. Most likely
among the reasons that the facet dealing with monitoring
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did not yield any significant results, is that monitoring
is a much more complicated process, involving the use of
prior knowledge and continued reading, than the experiment
allowed for. Perhaps an experiment in which feedback was
more flowing so that readers could ask for words and be
given them immediately. might clear the issue slightly.
As suggested before, maybe monitoring is too personal of
a process to be scrutinized by experimenting with groups.
Whatever is said about the experiment reported here,
it must be kept in mind that this was a small, informal
study meant to be used only as a source of discussion
rather than as an indicator of truth.
CHAPTER V
APPLICATIONS TO THE HIGH SCHOOL READING PROGRAM
One real value of understanding the reading process
as described by Goodman, Smith, Ruddell and others is that
it is not as menacing to the content area teacher as the
"subskills" model. High school teachers who throw up their
hands in despair when confronted by nine paragraph types,
thirteen word attack types, various reading rates and
sundry varieties of comprehension might calm down when
told that their major goal as teachers of reading is to
get children to read. Of course that task is not nearly
as simple as it sounds, but it is an understand.able goal,
as well as one which is difficult to rationalize away.
How many teachers would honestly answer "No" to the
questions: "Shouldn' t you be req'uiring reading as a
consistent part of your learning activities?" and
"Shouldn't you then make a conscious effort to insure




Content area teachers who would answer "No" to
either of the above questions may have an exaggerated
view of the importance of their knowledge of their field.
How many of the facts or theories taught in high school
are as important as the skill to locate facts and formu-
late theories? That skill. the ability to teach oneself,
is intrinsically knit to reading. Teachers sometimes fear
that students will not understand what they read and thus
prefer to tell them rather than have them find out for
themselves. Such teachers are teaching a lesson in media
as well as in their content area. They are teaching
students that getting a message from printed material is
too difficult to be worthwhile, and that an inquisitive
person is better off waiting for someone to tell him or
her the answer to a troubling question than to loo'k for
the answer in a boo·k. This lesson, if taught consistently
as it inadvertantly is in many high schools, does not
foster the type of intellectual independence one would
hope a student would have upon leaving school.
The high school reading specialist might look at
the students he or she has to deal with as belonging to
one of two basic groups. One group has very few members;
i~ some schools it may have none. That group consists of
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those students who have virtually no sight vocabulary.
They look at a page of writing and don't recognize any-
thing, with the exception of letters or a few small words.
They do not possess that basic semantic awareness alluded
to earlier in this discussion, or at best they don't know
how to apply it. This group requires the kind of special
help in reading which a content area teacher cannot be ex-
pected to give efficiently.
The second group, to which nearly all high school
students belong, consists of students who know the verbal
correlates for a number of written words. They can t'word
call" or pronounce with some success the words printed
in a book if the vocabulary or concept load of the book
is not beyond them. Granted, they vary on many signifi-
cant grounds, such as reading rate, ability to comprehend,
and size of vocabulary. But they are the same in that
they all will get better at reading if they are prepared
for reading assignments which involve materials which are
challenging but not frustrating, and actually read those
assignments on a regular basis.
Naively simplistic? The task of preparing and
motivating students of divergent reading proficiency for
reading assignments or personal reading is not a simple one.
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It is merely the goal, to have everyone involved in some
form of reading which is meaningful to the reader, which
is simply stated.
How can this simple goal with complex implications
be reached? Suggestions concerning materials, teaching
methods, and evaluation will be made here.
"Reading to learn may well stimulate learning to
read, but only if the concept load (roughly the number of
new ideas presented) is not so heavy as to cause the
reader to lose any sense of meaning." (Goodman, 1976,
p. 486). The idea of using mUltiple texts in high school
classrooms is not a revolutionary one, but it is one which
deserves new scrutiny from the perspective of the reading
model presented here. Poorer readers, being poorer guessers,
need materials in which the guessing is easier. As was
suggested earlier, the so-called problem readers, those
who simply can't get anything meaningful from reading
assignments or don't try, aren't applying what they know
to what they read. It is likely that they either don't
know how or don't know that they are supposed to. There-
fore materials which entail a lighter conceptual load are
desirable. Of course more proficient readers can and should
be required to handle more complex materials.
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The typical arguments made by content area teachers
against the use of multilevel materials are twofold. It
is often felt that the lower level texts "water down" the
content so that the student who uses such readings does
not learn all the material. Having more than one text in
a classroom is also felt to be cumbersome for the teacher.
For many it might interrupt the flow of their teaching.
The "water down" argument won't hold water. \'1hy
present a conceptual load to a student that he or she can't
handle? Vlhy as'k a student to deal with reading material
which is meaningless because he or she does not have
sufficient grammatical or contextual awareness to interact
with i~ naturally? The content area teacher who insists that
everyone in his or her class perform at the same conceptual
level is not doing justice to those above or below that
level.
The second argument is not easily answered. It is
difficult and awkward to deal with multilevel materials in
a classroom. Many teachers are honestly working at near
capacity before a reading specialist invades with over-
bearing enthusiasm and overwhelming innovation. The
problem then becomes an administrative one. Either help
must be given to the classroom teacher or students must be
scheduled so that each class is as homogeneous as possible.
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Having multilevel reading material in the classroom
does not mean much unless the content area teacher pre-
pares and motivates the students to use it. Suggestions
for effecting those goals will be discussed later. Before
that discussion it must be noted that the psycholinguistic
understanding of reading makes another demand on the use
of materials in the high school. If language use is
natural, and reading is a secondary linguistic activity,
then the high school must make every effort to make
reading material easily available to satisfy any student's
natural curiosity or need for entertainment or creative
catalyst.
A logical way of effecting this goal is saturation
(Fader and McNeil, 1966, p. 17). This technique involves
openly displaying newspapers, magazines, and paperback
books in classrooms for students to picok up and read at
their leisure. students are allowed to take these
materials with a minimum of restriction. Rather than
asking a student to sign something before borrowing it,
a teacher might simply say, "Bring it bac"k when you're
done." Censorship of such materials must be kept at a
minimum. It has been my experience that the sexiest,
scariest and goriest books I have read in recent years
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have been those which ninth and tenth grade students
have recommended to me. It would be difficult to stock
school shelves with racier ooo'ks t"han those which are
brought to school in student's back pockets.
Three advantages of using saturation as a facet
of the reading program become evident (Fader and· r/lctleil.
1966, pp. 24-25). Newspapers, magazines and paperbacks
are designed and written to make people want to read
them. They have to sell to be successful. They also
are links to the world outside of school. If educators
are concerned aoout the tra~sfer of knowledge and skills
tatlght in school to real-life situations J what better
way to insure it than to bring real life into the class-
room. Finally, maximizing the contact the student has
with print not ~nly acclimatizes him to its presence, but
also allows for a more spontaneous, natural use of it.
Something that approximates the student's already pro-
ficient language use.
A number of objections are imaginable. It's
Inessy. but then sterility and growth are not comple-
mentary concepts. It could possibly disrupt the normal
flow of classroom procedures. Students might read the
funny papers during lectures. On the other hand, course
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content could be related to or supplemented by features
in newspapers and magazines, anchoring a drifting concept
to the beaches of reality. Finally, it might cost money.
If 'kids are allowed to 'A/alk away with books, valuable
materials will be lost each semester before the district
gets its money's worth from them. But is value measured
in the number of years a boo'k sits on a shelf or in the
number of times it is read? Those who propound the final
argument remind me of the cook who always made banana-nut
bread for dessert because no one would eat it. It would
last longer.
The pedagogic emphasis suggested by this model of
reading is on preparing the student to read. Students must
be primed with prior knowledge in order for them to interact
with print. Goodman sees reading in the content area class-
room as reinforcement. He believes that concepts and ideas
should first be developed through demonstration, experi-
mentation, and concrete illustration before reading assign-
ments are given (1976, p. 486). Vocabulary must also be
developed orally beforehand. Material to be read is more
meaningful to a student who has had (a) experience with the
concepts involved and (b) exposure to speci.alized vocabulary.
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As intimated by the previous discussion about miscues,
teachers should let students know that the meaning of each
single word in a message is not nearly as important as the
meaning of the message itself. Still, each content area
teacher must deal with vocabulary which is crucial to his
or her subject. Goodman suggests five reasons - why a word
might not· be in a student's reading vocabularyl
1) The reader neither understands the concept
nor has the word in oral vocabulary.
2) The reader understands the concept but has
never used the particular word in question.
J) The reader has heard the word but doesn't
know the concept.
4) The reader has used the word orally without
understanding it.
5) The reader attaches the correct concept to
the word. even though it is not part of his
oral vocabulary. (1976, pp. 487-488)
I might add that often a profi.cient reader will have
a general feeling for the meaning of a word without having
the ability to define it exactly. This is beginning to
sound like one of the lists concerning reading skill that
are antithetical to models of rea,ding influenced by Chomsl{y.
The difference is that all six of the ways to misunderstand
a word mentioned above can be remedied by the same basic
75
method of teaching vocabulary. That method is simply to
talk about a word before reading it. Once a reader has
lin·ked a word to its concept in his or her oral vocabulary,
he C~l begin to make predictions about the probability of
its appearance in print.
The oral activity that goes on in a classroom in
preparation for a reading assignment should not be one-
sided. Everything said about language in this discussion
has stressed interaction. By utilizing student input in
arriving at definitions and formulating concepts, the
teacher is not only teaching cognitive strategies but is
also effectively bolstering memory of the concepts dis-
cussed. Given the importance of aggressive listening or
reading, it is not surprising that participation in
creating pairs of words has been found to facilitate
memory of those pairs to a significant degree. (Anderson,
Goldberg, and Hidde, 1976, p. 585). In other words, if
the teacher presents a word and the student supplies a
synonym the student will remember both words better than
if both had been presented by the teacher.
In further research concerning teacher behavior and
student memory, Anderson also found that general, abstract
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terms are recalled by students more completely when they
are modified with concrete terms by the teacher (1976,
pp. 588-596). This modification. called concretization
by Anderson, can be seen in the context of the model of
reading presented here as a way of tying a concept into
the prior knowledge the student already possesses. In
simple terms, teachers should give a lot of examples, or,
better yet, let students give a lot of examples.
Nothing of what has been said about technique here
is new or obscure to the body of pedagogic practices already
in use. The emphasis is on using instruction as preparation
for reading and reading as a reinforcement to instruction.
It is unreasonable for a high school teacher to expect the
majority of his or her students to grasp concepts pre-
sented in reading assignments without assistance unless
the concepts are close to something ,already understood.
How often are students as'ked to read something in prepara-
tion by the teacher? Oral language is the primary medium.
It should be used first.
Materials which fit the conceptual level of the
student and preparation for reading by the teacher are not
enough, however, to insure that students will actually read
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what they are asked to read. Rieck (1977) conducted a
survey of students who admitted that they did not read the
assignments of certain teachers. It was found that those
teachers tended not to prepare the students for assignments
by explaining why the reading was needed and what to look
for. It was also found that the reading assignments made by
such teachers were rendered meaningless because the instructors
tended neither to discuss the readings after they had been
read nor to ask questions which required reading on tests.
other more generally negative messages about reading were
telegraphed by these teachers. For instance, they tended
neither to read aloud to their students nor to furnish
reading time in class and actually read silently in front
of the students.
It is a rare student who will do what a teacher asks
without being convinced that he or she needs to or at least
ought to do it. The teacher must create an atmosphere in
which reading appears desirable, important and necessary.
If readings are sufficiently prepared for and if materials
are appropriate, students ought to be tested on them or
asked to discuss them. Reading must be a meaningful part
of what goes on in a classroom. This is more crucial than
any single technique. The teacher must convey the message
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that he or she wants the student to read.
While discussing material in class, teachers would
do a great service to their students by emphasizing spec-
ulation and prediction, and de-emphasizing the importance
of correctness. Practice in reacting to ideas is practice
at being an aggressive language user. While discussing
something that a student has read, the instructor might
stop at certain points to as'k, tt\-lhat did you think when you
read this?" The student might be surprised to find that the
thinking is more important than barrelling ahead to get to
the last page. It would be possible to design lessons in
which the primary tas'k was predicting the meaning of in-
complete printed material, something like the experiment
presented earlier. Research might attempt to find if such
instruction would improve the comprehension or rate of
reading of high school students significantly. Such in-
struction could be compared to skill-building instruction
and/or free-reading time o
The psycholinguistic models of reading imply as many
warnings as they do suggestions. Smith (1973, p. 185)
suggests twelve ways to make learning to read difficult,
some of which apply to the high school situation. The tongue-
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in-cheek bits of advice are Smith's; the explanations are
supplied by the author:
--Teach words one at a time. This way you will discourage
students from pairing ideas, thus making them more
difficult to remember.
--Discourage guessing. Encourage paranoia.
--Encourage the avoidance of errors. You will also encourage
avoidance of participation in discussion.
--Provide immediate feedback. Don't let them think about
what they've just said or read.
--Detect and correct incorrect eye ~ovements. Don't be con-
cerned with how well the student comprehends, just make
sure he moves his eyes right.
--Identify and give attention to problem readers as soon as
possible. That way you can alienate and isolate the
student from his peers. It's great for damaging self~
image and fostering resentment to school.
--Make sure students are serious about not falling behind.
This will insure that the student realizes the number of
pages he or she reads is much more important than under-
standing anything on those pages.
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--Insist on perfect spelling and the best possible English.
Half of your students will soon hate using language in
your class.
--Change methods if yours isn't working. When a student
struggles a little, change your whole approach and really
confuse him.
A final criticism made by psycholinguists concerning
practitioners of the techniques related with the subskills
theory of reading is that they spend too much time on
diagnostic testing (Goodman, 1976, p. 490). Rather than
attempting to find the exact level at which a reader is
functioning for any number of s'kills fragmented from the
flow of proficient reading, the psycholinguist might
suggest finding something the reader could deal with and
having him read both orally and silently, discussing all
the while. Again, this philosophy is tailor-made for
high school reading teachers since, as was mentioned
earlier, the majority of his or her students can read
something. The high school reading specialist who adheres
to the model of reading discussed here might spend more time
ensuring that meaningful reading is happening in all class-
rooms and evaluating why it is not, than in evaluating
stud ent wea.'knesses.
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In summary. language use is natural. Reading is
artificial in its use of apparently meaningless letters,
but most high school students are basically aware of the
way those symbols work. The goal of the high school
teacher is to give the student practice and guidance in
aggressively making his or her reading a closer approxi-
mation of the natural language process. Everything
taught in connection with reading at the secondary level




train up --- trac'k --- --- sight, --- --- ---
hills burnt timber, Nick sat --- --- --- bundle ---
canvas --- bedding --- baggage --- --- pitched --- --- ---
door --- --- baggage ---. --- no town, --- --- --- rails
--- burnt-over country. thirteen saloons --- --- ---
street --- Seney --- --- --- trace.
--- looked --- --- b'urnt-over --- --- hillside, ---- --- ---
expected --- --- --- --- --- --- --~ --- --- then walked
--- --- river. --- river --- there. swirled log
spiles --- --- bridge. N[c·k·. -loo'ked --- ---
water, colored pebbly bottom, watched trout
--- ---, steady current --- \vavering ---.
--- --- --- holding themselves with --- noses --- current,
many trout --- deep, --- --- water, --- distorted he
watched --- --- --- glassy convex surface --- ---,
surface pushing swelling smooth --- --- resistance
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